



# CS259D: Data Mining for Cybersecurity



# Phishing


- **Goal:**
  - Account information
  - Logon credentials
  - Identity information
- **Attack vectors:**
  - Legitimate-looking emails
  - Legitimate-looking websites

# Scale of the problem

## Daily Phishes Verified

chart created Nov 13 2014 22:50 UTC

PhishTank





# Detection

- Toolbars
  - Spoofguard
  - Netcraft
- Email filtering
  - Examples:
    - SpamAssassin
    - Spamato
  - Advantages:
    - More complete context (content, headers, etc.)
    - Completely shield user from decision-making process



# Phishing classification: Features

- IP-based URLs
  - Example:
    - [http://192.168.0.1/paypal.cgi?fix account](http://192.168.0.1/paypal.cgi?fix%20account)
  - Compromised PCs with no DNS entries
  - Binary feature
- Age of linked-to domain names
  - Registered legitimate-sounding domain names
    - Example: playpal.com, paypal-update.com
  - Typically short life-span
    - Registered using stolen credit cards, canceled by registrar
    - Domain caught by anti-phishing monitors
    - Often lasting only ~ 48 hours
  - Obtained using a WHOIS query
  - Binary feature: Lifetime < 60 days



# Phishing classification: Features

- Non-matching URLs
  - Example: `<a href="badsite.com"> paypal.com</a>`
  - Binary feature: URL text different from HREF
- “Here” links to non-modal domain
  - Example: Click here to restore your account
  - Modal domain: domain most frequently linked to
  - Binary feature: link with text “link”, “click”, “here” that links to a domain other than modal domain



# Phishing classification: Features

- HTML emails
  - Binary feature: email section with MIME type text/html
- Number of links
  - Numeric feature: # links in HTML part(s) of email
  - Link defined by an `<a>` tag with href attribute
    - Including mailto: links

# Phishing classification: Features

- Number of domains
  - Domain names for URLs starting with http/https
  - Only the main part of the domain name
    - What registrar gets paid for
      - Not necessarily same as combination of top- & 2nd-level domain
    - Example:
      - **university.edu** for [www.cs.university.edu](http://www.cs.university.edu)
      - **company.co.jp** for [www.company.co.jp](http://www.company.co.jp)
        - Top-level: **.jp**, second-level: **.co**
  - Numeric feature: #distinct domains



# Phishing classification: Features

- Number of dots
  - Subdomains:  
<http://www.my-bank.update.data.com>
  - Redirection script:  
<http://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.badsite.com>
    - Looks to naïve user to be from google.com
    - Redirects browser to badsite.com
  - Numeric feature: Maximum number of dots in any of the links in the email



# Phishing classification: Features

- Contains javascript
  - Binary feature: string “javascript” appears in email
- Spam filter output
  - Binary feature: class assigned to email by SpamAssassin



# Evaluation

- 10-fold cross validation
- Classifier: Random forest
  - 10 decision trees
  - Each decision made on a random attribute
  - Trees pruned



# Evaluation

- SpamAssassin ham corpora
  - ~6950 non-phishing non-spam
- Publicly available phishingcorpus
  - ~ 860 phishing messages
  - Challenge with WHOIS queries
    - Only 505 domains out of 870 domains
    - Increases false negative rate

# Evaluation

Feature	Non-Phishing Matched	Phishing Matched
Has IP link	0.06%	45.04%
Has “fresh” link	0.98%	12.49%
Has “nonmatching” URL	0.14%	50.64%
Has non-modal here link	0.82%	18.20%
Is HTML email	5.55%	93.47%
Contains JavaScript	2.30%	10.15%
SpamAssassin Output	0.12%	87.05%

# Evaluation

Feature	$\mu_{\text{phishing}}$	$\sigma_{\text{phishing}}$	$\mu_{\text{non-phishing}}$	$\sigma_{\text{non-phishing}}$
Number of links	3.87	4.97	2.36	12.00
Number of domains	1.49	1.42	0.43	3.32
Number of dots	3.78	1.94	0.19	0.87

# Evaluation

Classifier	False Positive Rate $fp$	False Negative Rate $fn$
PILFER, with S.A. feature	0.0013	0.036
PILFER, without S.A. feature	0.0022	0.085
SpamAssassin (Untrained)	0.0014	0.376
SpamAssassin (Trained)	0.0012	0.130

# Review of TF-IDF

- Measure importance of word in document
- TF = frequency of word in document
- IDF = measure popularity of word in corpus
  - $\text{Log}(N/\#\{\text{documents having the term}\})$
- $\text{tf-idf}(t, d, D) = \text{tf}(t, d) \times \text{idf}(t, D)$





# Robust hyperlinks

- Lexical signatures for identifying URLs
- Signature words chosen using TF-IDF
- Experiments: 5 terms enough for unique page identification



# Observation

- Minimal changes to original page detectable via robust hyperlinks
- Phishing sites often include brand names
  - Common on brand's webpages
  - Rare on the web



# Algorithm

- Compute term TF-IDFs
- Find top 5 terms
- Submit terms as query to Google
- Check if domain is among top-N results
- Assumption: phishing pages have low pagerank



## Lowering false positives

- Include domain name in lexical signature
- Heuristic: Zero results Means Phishing

# Example

The screenshot shows the eBay.com sign-in page in Microsoft Internet Explorer. The browser window title is "eBay.com - Microsoft Internet Explorer". The address bar shows the URL: [http://3358563787/index.htm?SignIn&co\\_partnerId=2&userId=&siteid=0&pageType=&pa1=&i1=&bshowgif=&UsingSSL=&](http://3358563787/index.htm?SignIn&co_partnerId=2&userId=&siteid=0&pageType=&pa1=&i1=&bshowgif=&UsingSSL=&). The page features the eBay logo at the top left. Below the logo is a "Sign In" header with a "Help" link. The main content is divided into two columns. The left column is for "New to eBay?" and includes the text "If you want to sign in, you'll need to register first." and "Registration is fast and free." with a "Register >" button. The right column is for "Already an eBay user?" and includes the text "eBay members, sign in to save time for bidding, selling, and other activities." followed by "eBay User ID" and a text input field, a "Forgot your User ID?" link, "Password" and another text input field, a "Forgot your password?" link, a "Sign In Securely >" button, and a checkbox labeled "Keep me signed in on this computer unless I sign out." The browser's status bar at the bottom shows "Done" and "Internet".

Sign In [Help](#)

New to eBay? **or** Already an eBay user?

If you want to sign in, you'll need to register first.

Registration is fast and free.

eBay members, sign in to save time for bidding, selling, and other activities.

**eBay User ID**


[Forgot your User ID?](#)

**Password**

[Forgot your password?](#)


[Keep me signed in](#) on this computer unless I sign out.

# Example



# Example

- Top terms: eBay, user, sign, help, forgot



The screenshot shows a Google search results page. At the top, the Google logo is on the left, and navigation links for 'Web', 'Images', 'Video', 'News', 'Maps', and 'more' are on the right. A search bar contains the text 'eBay, user, sign, help, forgot' and a 'Search' button. Below the search bar, the text 'Results 1 - 10 of about 4,080,000 for eBay, user, sign, help, forgot (0.24 seconds)' is displayed. The main content area lists several search results, each with a blue title and a snippet of text. The results include links to 'Forgot User ID', 'About Signing in to Your Account', 'Problems Signing-in?', 'Welcome - PayPal', and 'Sign In'. On the right side, there is a 'Sponsored Links' section with three links: 'eBay® - Official Site', 'Looking for eBay? Find exactly what you want today. www.ebay.com', and 'eBay Selling Help'.

Google Web Images Video News Maps more »  
eBay, user, sign, help, forgot Search Advanced Search Preferences

Web Results 1 - 10 of about 4,080,000 for eBay, user, sign, help, forgot (0.24 seconds)

**Forgot User ID**  
Hello! **Sign** in/out. **Forgot User ID** ... Use of this Web site constitutes acceptance of the **eBay User Agreement and Privacy Policy**. ...  
[cgi4.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?UseridRecognizerShow](#) - 16k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

**About Signing in to Your Account**  
If you ever **forgot** your **User ID** or password, you can have **eBay** send it to your ... If you're a Passport **user**, **sign** in with your **eBay User ID** and password. ...  
[pages.ebay.com/help/newtoebay/signin.html](#) - 33k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

**Problems Signing-in?**  
**eBay** uses cookies to **help** you **sign** in. Make sure that your browser is set to ... I cannot **sign** in because I **forgot** my **User ID**. Ask **eBay** to send your **User ID** ...  
[pages.ebay.com/help/newtoebay/sign-in-trouble.html](#) - 35k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)  
[ [More results from pages.ebay.com](#) ]

**Welcome - PayPal**  
Member Log-in, **Forgot** your email address? **Forgot** your password? ... Free **eBay** tools make selling easier. PayPal works hard to **help** protect sellers. ...  
[www.paypal.com/](#) - 21k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

**Sign In**  
**Sign** in, **Help** ... If you want to **sign** in, you'll need to register first. ... Use of this Web site constitutes acceptance of the **eBay User Agreement and** ...  
[signin.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignIn](#) - 16k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

Sponsored Links  
**eBay® - Official Site**  
Looking for **eBay**?  
Find exactly what you want today.  
[www.ebay.com](#)

**eBay Selling Help**  
Full-service **eBay** selling solution.  
Easy, convenient & great results.  
[SellingRequest.com](#)  
Philadelphia, PA



## Other features

- Age of domain
- Known images
  - Presence of inconsistent well-known logos
  - Top-10 identified targets: eBay, PayPal, Citibank, Bank of America, Fifth Third Bank, Barclays Bank, ANZ Bank, Chase Bank, and Wells Fargo Bank
- Suspicious URL
  - Contains @ or – in domain name







# Other features

- Suspicious links
  - Same as suspicious URLs
- IP address as domain
- Dots in URL
  - Binary: #Dots > 5
- Forms
  - HTML <input> tag, with text such as “credit card”, “password”


# Evaluation



# Evaluation



# Evaluation





## References

- “Learning to Detect Phishing Emails”, Fette et al, 2007
- “Cantina: A content-based approach to detecting phishing websites”, Zhang et al, 2007